A consensus has arisen about the importance of structuring processes and implementation dynamics for the success of responsible practices, at different level of analysis (see Robinson 2011, p. 268) : micro-level (where responsible leaders can act as role models in their work with individuals and teams); meso-level (where contribution to organizational discussions and policy development is at stake); macro-level (where professional bodies engage politically and ensure their voice is heard at national and international/global forums).
As a consequence, in business ethics-focused research multiple level of analysis (and their mutual interrelations) have to be taken into account: Member of the Board of Directors; CEOs; Member of CSR working group; CSR Managers/Coordinators; employees that have the information needed and/or have a strong opinion about CSR organisational performance; employees that do not have the information needed and/or do not have a strong opinion about CSR organisational performance; external stakeholders.
Therefore, an interest about how groups are articulated and how "responsible" processes, projects, policies and strategies are jointly negotiated and relationally carried out -in a cooperative and constructive way -remains crucial. The latter core issues can be defined in terms of social ontology: a new alliance between empirical research and metaphysical and ontological enquiry about the relational/societal aspects within organisational -and within their responsibility-related political, environmental, social, techno-environmental, legal, ethical dimensions (see Morandi, 2006) -is desirable, now more than ever.
From a sociological realist point of view (as analysed in Arrigoni 2018), the way "responsibility" is implemented within any given organisation/corporation is "a form of knowledge through which the members […] produce a self-representation of themselves as whole" (Morandi 2017, p. 28). As we can state about any possible social process and context, each shared representation (e.g. a company code of ethics, or a CSR report) diffuses a self-interpretation capable of influencing social practises. This is particularly intriguing if we remember that organisational contexts and practises are neither empirically nor cognitively accessible outside of their (symbolic) representations; no member can perceptually experience its partaken organisation "as a whole": nonetheless, we can observe that -in each specific empirical relation or responsible practise -there exist a social/organizational dimension, mediated by symbolic representations.
Therefore, a duality (a complementarity?) is there, between: 1) a kind of research that tries to attain CSR objective dimension and attempts to focus on its structural coordinates; 2) a different kind of research that takes subjective dimensions into account, and seeks to point out how -together ! 6 with the objectivity of social phenomena -psychic (social psychology) and anthropological elements concur (Morandi 2017, p. 26) .
As for the social realm, then, social ontology can be meant to be concerned with investigating the manner in which social phenomena depend necessarily on human interactions, and therefore can also be concerned with the nature of such existents as social relations, corporations, communities, power, authorities, trust, cooperation, institutions, norms, rules, custom, convention, collective practice. As a consequence, what kind of moral and ontological meaning is implied in shared agency, collective intentionality and collective responsibility, all of which are necessary dynamics for responsibility to be effective and real? Are we dealing with emergent social entities or just with institutional facts (see for example Lawson, 2016)?
We have very good reasons to believe that the inclusion of social ontology into the vexing dilemma about delineating the boundary between individual (ethical) and collective (organisational) responsibility can surely enrich this longstanding debate. As abstract as it may sound, the operational implementation and reconstitution of responsible practices has a lot to do, when economic processes are at stake, with the ontological and symbolical analysis and representation of the dynamic corporation form.
If we think of the firm as an emergent reality, as a cohesive irreducible whole made of human and non-human components which is (and needs to be) dynamically reconstituted (as for example suggested in Chassagnon, 2014, p. 199 , but also in Demaria, 1982 from a totally different "metaphysical" point of view), all of the above prominent areas of activity maintain a cohesive continuity, and responsible policies and behaviours endure through specific "articulated" dynamics. The notion of "articulation" (whose metaphysical-sociological implications have been defined and analysed in Morandi, 2017, while the notion itself was introduced by Eric Voegelin, 1987) essentially and primarily denotes an emergent property of empirical relations: "this process in which human beings form themselves into a society for action [can] be called the articulation of a society" (Voegelin, 1987, p. 37) . The latter notion can entail a possible ramification towards political science -which however remains relevant for CSR studies -but, even more importantly, we underline that "articulation" denotes an actualisation, something that brings into being ability and possibility of a commonaction, i.e. a community. Chassagnon (2014, p.199 ) describes this possibility in terms of "emergent processes of cooperation and cohesiveness": more specifically, organisation of responsibility (and responsible organisations) are based on an ability to act for a common goal and on the cohesiveness that is created to achieve this goal. and disadvantages of holding particular kinds of groups morally responsible in practice, and the main coordinates of this debate can also be interestingly drawn into CSR studies, both from a theoretical and practical point of view. Overall, the main underlying issues can be summarized as follows: a) whether or not collective responsibility makes morally sense, making it possible for groups ! 9 to be distinctively blameworthy or guilty; b) how can collective responsibility be distributed across individual members; c) how collectively ascribed responsibility potentially clash with social justice, and how collective responsibility can be operationally productive and fair.
In brief, we can observe how contemporary critics of collective responsibility rely on two assumptions: a) that actions -as distinguishable from mere behaviours -are based on intentions; b) in order to be held responsible of anything, a specific "bad intention" is required. Since collectives do not have "mental lives" or hold beliefs in an intentional way, a number of authors -including for example Lewis (1948) or more recently Narveson (2002) -can try and demonstrate that actions and moral agency can be exclusively associated with individuals.
On the other hand, defenders of collective responsibility rely on multiple philosophical and practical arguments to justify the possibility of collective responsibility. Among the many theoretical streams that could be potentially included and mentioned, we can outline the following: a) very simply, "blaming attitudes are held towards collective as well as individuals" (Cooper, 1968, p. 258) , and quite often we refer our emotional states -like indignation, resentment, approval -to groups, or we can experience something similar -shame or pride, for instance -as (1) some group actions have an identifiable moral agent (e.g. a representative body, a board, etc.), and a set of self-consciously decision are made on a rational and shared basis; this happens particularly where courses of actions can be chosen by consolidated organisational mechanisms, such as standard of conduct enabling to identify group discipline, group ethos and a configuration of defined roles by which organisational powers are exercised;
(2) paradigmatically, collective responsibility can be ascribed where group members share common needs or take strong interest in in each other's interests, since they are more likely to jointly pursue projects and solidarity dynamics (e.g. strong identification, proud exhibition of collective consciousness, etc.) (3) shared attitudes can make the group itself eligible for collective responsibility; a) collective intentionality may be the key to understand when and whether group meet the same conditions of moral responsibility that individuals do, as if a sort of truly plural subject could be ! 10 considered when more subjects combine in such a way as to make one subject: in this respect, while group intentions can barely or very unlikely sustained by the notion of "collective mind" (Sosa, 2009 ), the concepts of plural "joint commitments" (Gilbert, 2000; Bratman 1993 Bratman , 2006 or -even more, as seen above -of "we-intentions" (Tuomela, 2005 (Tuomela, , 2006 ) that supervene on individual intentional agency allow us to talk about how collective group-based intentions, belief, desires, projects can be taken into account.
Collective intentionality
If we think at responsible practises, projects and actions as instances of "joint actions" carried out by group agents such as business enterprises, the notion of "collective intentionality" is absolutely central. Collective intentional attitudes are like relevant indexes that play a decisive role in the constitution of social actions, and are of great interest for philosophers of actions, cultural anthropologists, social scientists: similarly, they could be of great interest for those streams of research aiming at understanding how, why and to what extent participants into responsible actions need to have at least a vague general idea of the enterprise as a whole, and a more structured idea of their allotted part in it (see Collingwood's definition of "society" in Collingwood, 1947, p. 146) . Generally speaking, a special attention needs to be placed to the specific modes in which this collective intentionality is constituted, and namely: collective acceptance as a precondition for the creation and sharing of a common institutional language; shared intentions as a way of coordinating their actions in a cooperative way; joint attention, as it makes it possible to experience a given organisational reality as an available common ground for multiple agents. How to translate all these "modes of collective intentionality" into measurable or at least investigable indexes for empirical research?
This surely represents a future challenge for CSR studies.
Nonetheless, a "central problem" about collective intentionality -put forward in terms of a crucial contradiction by Schweikard and Schmid (2013) Press.
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